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Abstract 
 
This paper concerns the effect of context on people’s judgments about sequences of chance 
outcomes. In Experiment 1, participants judged whether sequences were produced by 
“random”, mechanical processes (such as a roulette wheel) or skilled human action (such as 
basketball shots). Sequences with lower alternation rates were judged more likely to result 
from human action. However, this effect was highly context-dependent: A moderate 
alternation rate was judged more likely to indicate a random physical process when 
encountered amongst sequences with lower alternation rates than when embedded among 
sequences with higher alternation rates. In Experiment 2, predictions regarding the next 
outcome following a streak showed the same effect: A streak of three at the end of the 
sequence was judged less likely to continue by participants who had encountered shorter 
terminal streaks in previous trials than by those who had encountered longer ones. These 
contrast effects (a) help to explain variability in the types of sequences that are judged to be 
random and that elicit the gambler’s fallacy, and urge caution about attempts to establish 
universal parameterizations of these effects, (b) are congruent with theories of sequence 
judgment which emphasize the importance of people’s actual experiences with sequences of 
different kinds, (c) provide a link between models of sequence judgment and broader 
accounts of psychophysical/economic judgment, and (d) may offer new insight into 
individual differences in randomness judgments and sequence predictions. 
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Relatively random: Context effects on perceived randomness and predicted outcomes 
 
Probabilistic sequences of binary alternatives are ubiquitous in both the laboratory 
and the outside world: Stimuli are “signal” or “noise”, coin flips are “heads” or “tails”, and 
papers are rejected or accepted. How people represent, interpret, and produce such sequences 
is a central aspect of cognition that has been extensively researched (see Oskarsson, Van 
Boven, McClelland, and Hastie, 2009, for a review) and has important practical implications 
(e.g., Kwan, Wojcik, Miron-shatz, Votruba, & Olivola, 2012).  
Two aspects of sequence judgment have received particular attention. The first 
concerns perceptions of the generating process: How do people decide what kind of 
mechanism produced a given sequence of outcomes? Studies in which participants judge the 
randomness or likely source of sequences have shown that a key determinant of subjective 
randomness is the alternation rate (AR) – a measure of how often the sequence switches from 
one outcome to the other. (For example, the sequence @@@##@ alternates twice out of a 
possible five times, giving an AR of 0.4.) Sequences judged most random typically have 
alternation rates greater than 0.5. For example, Ayton and Fischer (2004) had participants 
judge whether sequences of @ and # symbols represented the outcomes of a random 
mechanical process (e.g., the heads and tails produced by flipping a coin) or skilled, 
intentional human action (e.g., the successful/unsuccessful shots of a professional basketball 
player). Increasing the AR from 0.2 to 0.8 produced a steady increase in judgements that the 
sequence was produced by the mechanical process.  
A second area of research concerns predictions of future outcomes. The most well-
known finding is that a streak of one outcome leads people to predict the opposite outcome 
on the next trial, even when the outcomes are strictly independent. This has been found both 
when people attempt to predict stochastic outcomes one after the other and when they are 
given a summary description of the sequence (e.g., Ayton & Fischer, 2004; Burns & Corpus, 
2004). It also occurs when people attempt to postdict the event that preceded a streak 
(Matthews, 2010) and arises in real financial decisions (e.g., Sundali & Croson, 2006). This 
belief in negative recency is usually labelled the Gambler’s Fallacy (GF). 
The inverse tendency is also widely documented. That is, in some situations a streak 
of one outcome leads to the prediction that the next trial will follow the streak (see Oskarsson 
et al., 2009). This positive recency is labelled belief in the hot hand (HH) after the 
demonstration by Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky (1985) that basketball fans expect a player 
who is on a scoring streak to have an elevated chance of success with his next shot, when in 
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fact there is no such positive recency in players’ performance (although some sports do show 
such hot and cold spells -- see e.g., Smith, 2003). 
The most widespread theoretical account of these phenomena is the idea that 
judgements are made using a representativeness heuristic, such that people expect local 
regions of a random sequence to be representative of their prototype or schema for random 
processes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). For example, a streak of four heads in a row is 
judged unlikely because it violates the characteristic of random sequences that both outcomes 
occur equally often, leading to elevated expectations of “tails” for the next flip (the GF). The 
same idea has been invoked to explain belief in the hot hand: A run of one outcome is judged 
unrepresentative of a random process, leading people to conclude that successive outcomes 
are positively correlated (Gilovich et al., 1985). Alternative accounts include the suggestion 
that the GF reflects a generalization of expectations from the sampling-without-replacement 
that characterizes many physical processes, whereas belief in the hot hand arises from a 
generalization of the positive recency that characterizes many aspects of human performance 
(e.g., Ayton and Fischer, 2004). Other theorists have emphasized folk ideas about luck and 
randomness (see Oskarsson et al., 2009), analyses of the waiting times for particular 
sequences (e.g., Hahn & Warren, 2009), or subjective complexity (Falk & Konod, 1997). 
A major challenge for theories of sequence judgment is that sequences with identical 
or similar properties can produce very different judgments. For example, Burns and Corpus 
(2004) found that the same sequence was judged less random and more likely to continue a 
streak when framed as a competitive human interaction than as the spins of a roulette wheel; 
likewise, instructing participants to construe outcomes as “like the flips of a coin” increased 
the prediction that a streak will end relative to a condition where they were given no specific 
instructions about the origin of the sequence (Boynton, 2003), and telling participants that 
sequences represented random outcomes led them to remember streaks as shorter than when 
the same sequences had been described as being produced by a complex algorithm (Olivola 
& Oppenheimer, 2008). Similarly, different studies find different critical values of sequence 
parameters. For example, the streak length required to elicit a significant gambler’s fallacy 
differs between studies (e.g., Croson and Sundali, 2005; Barron & Leider, 2010). Finally, 
there are marked individual differences in the tendency to show both the GF and HH (e.g., 
Sundali & Croson, 2006). 
There are doubtless many reasons for this variability. The current work examines the 
contribution of one potentially important factor, namely the context established by other 
recently encountered sequences. The judgments made in the foregoing studies did not occur 
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in isolation; the sequences were experienced in the context of other items presented during 
the experiment and encountered outside the laboratory, and this context may exert a marked 
influence on the judgment of a given sequence. Specifically, judgments can assimilate 
towards or contrast away from the other items in a stimulus ensemble. Assimilation can arise 
for several reasons. For example, the perception of the target may be a weighted average of 
that stimulus and the other stimuli in the set, each item may be judged relative to the previous 
one, or the participant may simply tend to repeat responses (see Matthews & Stewart, 2009, 
for a discussion). Contrast can arise when judgment of a given item is based on its distance 
from the mean of the set or its rank position (e.g., Helson, 1964; Parducci, 1965), or when 
people search for differences between the target and the preceding item (e.g., Damisch, 
Mussweiler, & Plessner, 2006). Assimilation and contrast effects have been found in various 
domains, including perceptual, social, and economic judgments, although they are not 
ubiquitous and are not always substantial (see e.g. Stewart, Chater, Stott, & Reimers, 2003).  
Whether perceived randomness and outcome prediction are context-dependent is 
important because theoretical development requires that we quantify the sequence properties 
that determine judgments. For example, Carlson and Shu (2007) have argued for a “rule of 
three”, such that “the third repeat event in a sequence is pivotal to the subjective belief that a 
streak is occurring” (p. 113). Similarly, it has been posited that alternation rates of 0.6 are 
regarded as “most random” (e.g., Oskarsson et al., 2009). It is important to establish the 
stability of such estimates to changes in context, partly to avoid incorporating erroneous 
parameter values into formal models, but also because the sources of parameter variation can 
guide the interpretation of the parameter estimates themselves. In addition, some theorists 
assume that sequence perceptions and predictions are a consequence of the kinds of 
sequences that humans typically experience. For example, Wilke and Barrett (2009) have 
argued that belief in the hot hand is an “evolved psychological default” based on foraging for 
clumpy resources, and can be reduced by experience with genuinely independent events. 
Central to such theorizing is the idea that perceptions of a given sequence can shift as a 
consequence of experience with other (unrelated) sequences – in other words, that they are 
context dependent. Finally, identifying and understanding contextual effects on judgments of 
randomness and sequence predictions may contribute to integrated theoretical development. 
Theories of contextual effects have been developed and applied across a range of perceptual, 
social, and economic domains (see below), and exploring the effect of context on sequence 
judgments may offer a step towards more general theoretical unification. 
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Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 1 used a procedure similar to Experiment 2 of Ayton and Fischer (2004). 
Participants were presented with sequences of outcomes and judged whether each sequence 
was more likely to have been produced by a “random” physical process (coin flips, roulette 
wheels, dice) or an intentional human action where positive recency may be the (perceived) 
norm (basketball, soccer, tennis). Each sequence comprised 21 outcomes coded as @ (n=11) 
and # (n=10), in random order, with the alternation rate chosen to be either low (0.15), 
medium (0.5), or high (0.85). All participants saw sequences with a medium alternation rate, 
but for some these were intermixed with low-AR sequences whilst for others they were 
intermixed with high-AR sequences. The key question was whether judgments about the 
process producing the medium-AR sequences depended on the context established by the 
other sequences in the experiment.  
 
Method 
 
Participants. Participants took part on-line in exchange for a small payment and were 
recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk using the Crowdflower crowdsourcing platform 
(www.crowdflower.com). The final sample comprised 165 participants (97 male, ages 18-74 
years, M= 31.9, SD = 12.0)
1
.  
 
Design and Procedure. The task was described as follows: 
“This study concerns your ability to recognize sequential patterns from various 
sources. Many processes produce a sequence of outcomes. For example, a coin may be tossed 
several times to produce a sequence of “heads” and “tails”, or a basketball player may take 
many shots to produce a sequence of “baskets” and “misses”. 
                                                          
1
 To ensure independent responses, only the first occurrence of a given ip address was used 
both within and between the two experiments, and a small number of participants were 
excluded for failing to complete the task (19 in Experiment 1; 3 in Experiment 2). Final 
sample sizes are after these exclusions. 
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On the following pages, you will be shown several sequences of outcomes. The 
outcomes are represented by the symbols @ and #. For example, one sequence might look 
like this:  
@@#@@###@@@##@#@@###@ 
So, you will not know what each outcome is, but you will be able to see the pattern of the 
sequence. Your task will be to judge which of two processes is more likely to have produced 
each sequence.” 
The following three pages each presented 12 sequences for judgment; each sequence 
was preceded by the words “What produced this sequence?” and was followed by a six-point 
rating scale, with lower numbers indicating greater likelihood that the sequence was produced 
by a random physical process and higher numbers indicating that the sequence was produced 
by skilled/intentional human performance. Three pages presented different versions of this 
task. In one scenario, the choice was between a series of coin flips (heads vs. tails) and a 
series of basketball shots (score vs. miss); for another, the choice was between roulette wheel 
spins (red/black) and soccer shots (score/miss); in the third scenario, the choice was between 
dice rolls (lands on even number/lands on odd number) and tennis serves (in/out). A 
preamble at the top of each page explained the two options. The extremes of the 6-point 
rating scale were given verbal labels appropriate to the choice (e.g., “Definitely Coin” and 
“Definitely Basketball”). Responses were required for all questions before the participant 
could progress to the next page. 
Each sequence had one of three alternation rates: 0.15 (low), 0.5 (medium), or 0.85 
(high). The sequences were produced by randomly generating outcomes subject to the 
constraint that the final sequence had the desired AR. Sequences with the medium alternation 
rate are referred to as “target” sequences. A set of 6 target sequences was randomly 
intermixed with 6 low-AR sequences; the same 6 target sequences were also randomly 
intermixed with 6 high-AR sequences. This gave two sets of 12 sequences, one where the 
target sequences were embedded in a high-AR context and another where the same targets 
were embedded in a low-AR context. This process was repeated 3 times to give three “low-
AR context” sequence sets and 3 “high-AR context” sequence sets. Participants in the low-
AR context condition were presented with the three low-AR context sets (one for each of the 
coin-basketball, roulette-soccer, and dice-tennis scenarios); participants in the high-AR 
context condition were given the three high-context sets. Examples of the sequences are 
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given in Table 1. Assignment of sequence sets to the different scenarios and order of scenario 
presentation were pseudorandom. The order of the sequences on each page was randomized 
for each participant. Eighty five participants were assigned to the low-AR context and 80 to 
the high-AR context. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
For each participant and each scenario, mean judgments were calculated separately 
for the context sequences and for the target sequences. The results are shown in Figure 1. 
We begin by examining the effect of alternation rate. In all three scenarios, 
independent-samples t-tests showed that the sequences with low alternation rate were judged 
more likely to have been produced by skilled human action than were the sequences with 
high alternation rate [for coin-basketball: t(163) = 9.63, d =1.51 p< .001; for roulette-soccer, 
t(163) = 7.37, d = 1.15, p <.001; for dice-tennis, t(163) = 7.19, d = 1.13, p<.001]. Similarly, 
paired-samples t-tests showed that the medium-AR (target) sequences were judged more 
likely to be the result of skilled human action than the high-AR sequences [for coin-
basketball, t(79) = 6.64, d = 1.69, p <.001; for roulette-soccer: t(79) = 4.73,  d = 1.16,  p 
<.001; for dice-tennis: t(79) = 3.00, d = 1.05, p = .004], but more likely to be the result of a 
random mechanical process than the low-AR sequences [for coin-basketball, t(84) = 7.78, d = 
1.57, p<.001; for roulette-soccer: t(84) = 6.04, d = 1.16, p<.001; for dice-tennis: t(84) = 8.40, 
d = 1.61  p<.001]. This pattern replicates the findings of Ayton and Fisher (2004). 
More importantly, judgments about the target sequences (which always had the same 
moderate alternation rate) depended upon the other sequences encountered in the experiment. 
For all three scenarios, target sequences were judged more likely to have been produced by 
skilled human performance in the high-AR context condition than in the low-AR context 
condition (for the coin-basketball scenario: t(163) = 9.17,d = 1.44,  p< .001; for roulette-
soccer, t(163) = 5.66, d = 0.89, p<.001; for dice-tennis
2
, t(147.5) = 6.37, d = 1.01, p<.001). 
Thus, there was a marked contrast effect in judgments about the process responsible for 
generating the target sequences. 
In short, sequences with rapid alternations between outcomes were judged more likely 
to have been produced by a random mechanical process (and less likely to have been 
                                                          
2
 Here and at certain points below the df are non-integer because a Welch correction has been 
applied because of unequal variances. 
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produced by skilled, intentional human action) than sequences with low alternation rates. 
However, judgments about a given sequence were strongly affected by the other sequences 
presented for judgment: If the context contained sequences with low alternation rates then 
sequences with a medium AR seem to have appeared less “streaky” and more “random” by 
comparison, and were correspondingly judged more likely to have been produced by a 
random mechanical process like a roulette wheel. On the other hand, if the context contained 
many sequences with high alternation rates (lots of short streaks) then the same moderate AR 
seems to have appeared “non-random” by comparison, and more likely to be the product of 
skilled human action. This contrast effect was substantial and there was no indication that 
judgments of the target sequences assimilated towards judgments of the context items. 
Experiment 2 extends these findings by examining predicted outcomes. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
In Experiment 2, participants predicted the next outcome in a sequence. The target 
sequences always ended with a streak of three, and context was manipulated between 
participants. For participants in the short-streak context condition, the target sequences were 
intermixed with sequences that ended in a streak of just one outcome. For those in the long-
streak context condition, the target sequences were intermixed with sequences that ended in a 
streak of five. Two versions of the task were constructed: one group of participants was told 
that the sequences corresponded to the flips of a coin; another group was told that the 
sequences depicted the outcomes of basketball shots. 
 
Method 
 
Participants. Participants were recruited on-line and screened as before, giving a 
sample of 433 (252 male, 2 decline to indicate gender; ages 18-69 years, M = 29.9, SD = 
10.7)
3
. 
Design and Procedure. Participants who completed the Coin version of the task were 
shown the following instructions: 
 
                                                          
3
 A larger sample was used than in Experiment 1 as a smaller effect was anticipated. 
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“On the next few pages, you will be asked to consider sequences of coin flips. The 
outcome of each flip is indicated by a letter, T for Tails and H for Heads. You will see a 
sequence of outcomes and be asked to indicate what you think the next outcome will be. 
There are no right or wrong answers -- we are interested in your gut feeling.” 
 
They then saw a series of 12 sequences. The sequences were presented one at a time 
on successive pages. Each sequence comprised 20 outcomes, 10 Heads and 10 Tails, that 
ended with a streak of length one (a single “H” or a single “T”), a streak of three (“H H H” or 
“T T T”) or a streak of five (“H H H H H” or “T T T T T”). Each sequence ended with a 
prompt “_____?” followed by the words “What will happen next? Choose a number from 1 
to 6, where larger numbers indicate greater likelihood that the next flip will be tails”. Below 
this was a six-point response scale anchored at 1 (“Definitely Heads”) and 6 (“Definitely 
Tails”). A response was required before participants could progress to the next sequence. 
A terminal streak of length n constrains the last n – 1 outcomes (because the outcome 
before the streak must be of the opposite type). For each sequence with a given terminal 
streak length, the remaining 20-n-1 outcomes were randomly chosen, subject to the constraint 
that, over the whole sequence, there be 10 of each outcome and an alternation rate of 0.5.That 
is, the sequences were matched for their outcome probabilities and overall “streakiness”.  
Sets of 18 sequences were constructed. In each set, 6 sequences ended with a short 
streak (one outcome); 6 ended with a medium streak (3 outcomes); and 6 ended with a long 
streak (5 outcomes). (Streaks of heads and tails were used equally often for each streak 
length). The medium-streak items formed the target sequences. The 6 short-streak sequences 
were randomly paired with the target items to give a “short-streak context” set of 12 
sequences (the same pairing was used across participants). Similarly, the 6 long-streak 
sequences were paired with the same target items to give a set of 12 “long-streak context” 
sequences. In both the short-streak and long-streak contexts, the target item in each context-
target pair was always shown second
4
. To ensure generality, three such sets of short-streak 
context and long-streak context sequences were produced and pseudorandomly assigned to 
participants. The order of the context-target pairs were randomized for each participant.  
Examples of the sequences are shown in Table 1. 
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 This paired structure was used to ensure that the contextual items were evenly distributed 
throughout the set and that participants had always seen at least one contextual item before 
judging their first target sequence. 
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The Basketball version of the task was identical, except that the “Heads” and “Tails” 
outcomes were replaced with “Miss” (M) and “Score” (S), respectively, and the wording of 
the instructions and response scale were modified accordingly. Participants were 
pseudorandomly assigned to the Coin and Basketball versions of the task. In total, 218 
participants completed the Coin version (110 in the Long context condition and 118 in the 
Short context condition) and 215 completed the basketball version (107 in the Long context 
condition and 108 in the Short context condition).  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The data were coded such that larger numbers indicate greater belief that the current 
streak will continue. For each participant, the mean judgment was calculated for both context 
and target sequences. The results are shown in Figure 2. 
Consider first the effect of streak length. Between-participant comparisons showed 
that streaks of 5 outcomes were judged less likely to continue than streaks of one outcome for 
both Coin and Basketball versions of the task [t(206.7) = 9.61, d = 1.30,  p <.001  and 
t(166.0) =8.25, d = 1.13, p <.001, respectively]. Similarly, paired-samples t-tests showed that 
the medium-length streaks of the target sequences were judged more likely to continue than 
the five-outcome streaks of the long-streak context items (for Coin task: t(109) = 7.13, d 
=0.68, p<.001; for Basketball task: t(106) = 3.06, d = 0.33, p = .003) but less likely to 
continue than the one-outcome streaks at the end of the short-streak context sequences (for 
Coin task: t(107) = 8.99, d = 1.61, p <.001; for Basketball task: t(107) = 11.89, d =1.51, 
p<.001). In short, the data replicate the common finding that longer streaks are judged more 
likely to end than shorter ones. 
More important is the effect of context on the target sequences. Independent samples 
t-tests showed that, for both the Coin and Basketball versions of the task, predictions for the 
target sequences depended on the other sequences seen during the experiment. Specifically, 
the three-outcome streaks were judged more likely to continue in the long-streak context than 
in the short-streak context (for Coin task: t(198.4) = 5.80, d =0.79, p<.001; for Basketball 
task, t(213) = 4.78, d =0.65, p<.001). (The context effect was the same for both the coin 
flipping and basketball scenarios: A 2 (scenario) x 2 (context) ANOVA on the judgments of 
the target sequences revealed no main effect of scenario, F(1,429) = 1.96, p = .162, 01.2 p  
and no context x scenario interaction, F(1,429) = .16, p = .686, 00.2 p .) 
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To check the robustness of these findings, I conducted a supplementary experiment 
using the basketball task
5
. For participants in the short-context condition, sequences ended 
with streaks of 1, 2, or 3 (each person judged 6 sequences of each type; 3 ending with a streak 
of “scores” and three ending with a streak of “misses”); the long-context condition was 
similar but used streaks of 3, 4, or 5. The order of sequences was randomized for each 
participant, who indicated their confidence in their predictions on a 6-point scale. (Points 1-3 
were labelled Very/Moderately/Slightly confident the next shot will miss; points 4-6 were 
labelled Slightly/Moderately/Very confident the next shot will score; responses were coded 
such that larger numbers indicated greater belief in streak continuation). The results mirrored 
the main experiment: Target streaks of length 3 were judged less likely to continue in the 
short-context condition (N = 188; M = 2.64, SD = 0.82) than in the long-context condition (N 
= 188; M = 3.21, SD = 0.70), t(365.9) = 7.23, p<.001. 
In summary, when a moderate streak occurs in a context containing several longer 
streaks it seems to appear relatively short and is thus judged more likely to continue. By 
contrast, when the same moderate streak occurs in amongst shorter streaks it seems relatively 
long and people expect it to end. Thus, the contrast effect found for judgments of randomness 
in Experiment 1 extended to outcome predictions in Experiment 2.  
 
 
General Discussion 
 
Individually-presented sequences are not judged in isolation. A moderate alternation 
rate of 0.5 was judged more likely to indicate a random, mechanical process when presented 
among of sequences with lower alternation rates than when intermixed with high-AR 
sequences. Similarly, a terminal streak of three was judged more likely to continue when 
other sequences in the experiment ended with longer streaks than when they ended with 
shorter ones (with overall outcome proportions and alternation rates matched). Thus, 
sequence judgments show substantial context effects (at least in some circumstances), and 
these effects take the form of judgmental contrast rather than assimilation. 
This contrast effect provides one explanation for the variability in sequence 
judgments noted in the Introduction, and urges caution about attempts to attach special 
significance to particular sequence parameters. The “rule of three” (Carlson and Shu, 2007), 
                                                          
5
 Full details are available from the author. 
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for instance, is likely to be an over-simplification; the run length that is perceived as 
indicative of a meaningful streak will depend on the context established by other, recently 
experienced sequences, and theories of sequence judgment need to incorporate this kind of 
parameter variation. The gambler’s fallacy, for example, may be the result of the 
representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972), but one needs the additional 
assumption that recently encountered sequences shape people’s prototype for what a random 
sequence looks like, thereby affecting how representative a particular streak seems to be of a 
random process. Similarly, the GF may reflect people’s treatment of random sequences as 
being akin to sampling without replacement (e.g., Ayton & Fischer, 2004), but with the 
caveat that people’s mental model of the “urn” from which sampling takes place depends 
upon recently-experienced sequences. The context effects reported here therefore serve to 
qualify rather than choose between competing accounts of sequence judgment, although the 
current data do lend credence to the broader theoretical claim that sequence perceptions and 
predictions depend upon people’s actual experiences with particular types of sequence (e.g., 
Hahn & Warren, 2009; Wilke & Barrett, 2009).  
What mechanism produced the contrast effects seen here? The most obvious 
interpretation is that they reflect a relative judgment process in which each sequence was 
compared against the others in the experiment. There are competing ideas about how such 
relative judgment may proceed. Helson’s (1964) adaptation level theory of psychophysical 
judgment posits the mean of the ensemble as the reference point, whereas Parducci’s (1965) 
range-frequency theory of category judgment assumes that judgments are a based on a 
compromise of rank position and position in the stimulus range. More recently, Stewart, 
Chater, and Brown’s (2006) Decision by Sampling account takes rank position to be of 
primary importance to a number of economically important judgments, and manipulating the 
rank position of target quantities has been found to affect people’s preferences in decisions 
under risk involving both monetary outcomes (e.g., Stewart, 2009) and human lives (Olivola 
& Sagara, 2009). Finally, in a preliminary study, Altmann and Burns (2005) explored a 
model in which the current streak was compared against sequences stored in memory using 
the ACT-R modelling framework (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998); if the current streak is shorter 
than the one retrieved, a repeat of the current outcome is predicted – giving the contrast effect 
seen in Experiment 2. It should be possible to choose between these competing possibilities 
by manipulating the composition of the judgment set (for example, by independently varying 
a given item’s rank position, distance from the mean, and position in the stimulus range), to 
see which factors influence judgment). In any case, the pronounced context effects found 
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here suggest that models of perceived randomness and outcome prediction can be integrated 
with broader theories of psychophysical judgment, economic decisions, and memory (see 
also Olivola & Oppenheimer, 2008).  
One question to arise from the current study is: What constitutes the comparison set 
against which the current sequence is compared? Similarity is likely to be a key determinant, 
and it may be that the context is overwhelmingly comprised of the other items presented in 
the experimental session, rather than incidental or superficially different stimuli encountered 
in the past (e.g., Matthews, 2012). However, there is evidence that context effects can extend 
beyond these kinds of immediate comparisons. For example, Tresselt (1948) found that the 
weight judged “medium” differed between weightlifters (who routinely lift heavy objects) 
and watchmakers (who routinely lift light objects; see also Olivola and Sagara, 2009, for a 
similar effect of background context on judgment). This raises the intriguing possibility that 
part of the individual variation in randomness judgments and the tendency to show the 
gambler’s and hot hand fallacies after encountering a given sequence (e.g., Sundali & 
Croson, 2006) emerges from pre-experimental experience with different types of sequence. It 
is also worth noting that, even if the context effects are limited to intra-experimental 
comparisons, there are potentially important implications when, for example, researchers are 
deciding between within- and between-subject designs. 
A related issue concerns whether the contextual effects require overt judgment of the 
context stimuli. We can ask whether context affects people’s perceptions of a given 
sequence, or their use of the response scale. The latter possibility might suggest no effect of 
contextual stimuli that are not overtly judged – although there is no way of establishing 
whether participants have covertly labelled the stimuli, and the behavioural outcome (the 
overt response to the target item) will typically be the same irrespective of the locus of the 
context effect. More generally, it will be important to investigate alternative sequence 
presentation formats. Barron and Leider (2010) found that the gambler’s fallacy was 
attenuated when, as in the current experiments, the outcomes forming a sequence were 
presented simultaneously rather than one at a time. Moreover, they found no GF at all when 
they replicated Burns and Corpus’ (2004) experiment using visually-presented outcomes 
rather than the original authors’ verbal description of the sequence structure. Whether the 
context effects established in the current work extent to other forms of sequence presentation 
and judgment task will be a useful line of future research. 
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Table 1. Example sequences from Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Experiment Sequence Type Examples 
1 Low-AR context @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ # # # # # # # # @ # # 
1 Low-AR context # @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ # # # # # # # # # @ @ @ 
   
1 Target # @ @ @ # @ @ # @ @ @ # # @ @ # # # # @ # 
1 Target @ @ # # # # @ @ # @ # @ @ # @ @ @ # # # @ 
   
1 High-AR context # @ # @ @ @ # @ # @ # @ # @ # @ # @ # # @ 
1 High-AR context @ # @ # @ # @ # @ # @ # # @ # @ @ # @ @ # 
   
2 Short-streak context T  H  T  H  T  T  T  H  H  T  H  H  H  H  H  T  T  T  H  T 
2 Short-streak context H  T  H  H  H  H  T  T  T  H  H  T  H  T  T  T  H  T  T  H 
   
2 Target T  T  H  H  T  T  H  H  H  T  H  T  H  H  T  H  H  T  T  T 
2 Target T  T  H  H  T  T  H  H  H  T  H  T  H  H  T  H  H  T  T  T 
   
2 Long-streak context H  T  T  T  T  H  T  T  T  H  T  H  T  H  T  H  H  H  H  H 
2 Long-streak context T  H  H  H  T  H  T  H  H  T  H  H  H  T  H  T  T  T  T  T 
 
Note: The examples shown for Experiment 2 are from the Coin task. For the Basketball task, 
T and H were replaced by S and M, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Results of Experiment 1. The graphs show the mean judgment for each type of 
sequence in each scenario; larger values indicate greater belief that the sequence was 
produced by skilled human action (a basketball player, soccer player, or tennis player) and 
smaller numbers indicate belief that the sequence was produced by a “random” mechanical 
device (coin flips, roulette wheel spins, or rolling dice). The Target sequences always have an 
alternation rate of 0.5. In the Low AR context, the context sequences have an AR of 0.15; in 
the high AR context, the context sequences have an AR of 0.85. Errors bars indicate 
plus/minus one standard error. 
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Figure 2. Results of Experiment 2. The graphs show the judged likelihood that the streak at 
the end of the sequence would continue; larger numbers indicate greater belief in streak 
continuation. The left and right panels show the results when the sequence was framed as a 
series of basketball shots and a series of coin flips, respectively. Target sequences always 
ended in a streak of three. In the short-streak context condition, context sequences ended with 
a run of one; in the long-streak context condition they ended with a run of five. Error bars 
show plus/minus one standard error. 
